UNEARTHING DEFENDANTS IN TOXIC WASTE
LITIGATION: PROBLEMS OF LIABILITY
AND IDENTIFICATION

Hazardous waste is emerging as a serious threat to public
health. Deterrence of unsafe disposal practices and compensation for costs imposed on the public are primary concerns for
both legislative andjudicialaction in this area. Litigationbased
on allegationsof tort liability will be impeded by inadequately
developed legal theory, particularlywhere a general disposal site
is involved. This Comment evaluates the plausibility of integrating strict products liability and risk share liability (an adaptation of market share liability) into a unified approach that may
provide tort victims with greateraccess to legal remedies.

INTRODUCTION
The potentially tragic human health consequences of disposal
of toxic waste are now widely recognized.' Yet, practical solutions to the problem of compensating victims injured by toxic
waste are at an embryonic stage. Toxic waste disposal sites
across the nation are an increasing source of injuries to people
living nearby.2 Harmful substances escaping from these sites in
the form of dangerous gases or groundwater leachates create a
zone of danger that may extend far beyond the location of disposal.3 This Comment examines two significant barriers to obtaining compensation from waste generators 4 posed by traditional
1. See generally M. BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF AMERICA BY
Toxic CHEMICALS (1979).
2. There are an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 waste disposal sites across the
United States of which at least 1,200 pose immediate health and safety hazards.
See Hazardousand Toxic Waste Disposal: JointHearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
EnvironmentalPollution, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1979).
3. The Second Annual Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Report says that "the most widely significant effect" of land disposal is contamination of groundwater. 9 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 2303 (1979).
4. The term "generator" as used in this Comment will refer to one whose
manufacturing operation produces a toxic waste.
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proof requirements, and proposes possible approaches for alleviating them.
First, a major hurdle confronted by a plaintiff is the need for a
viable theory of liability. Traditional common law theories provide tenuous support for claims arising out of toxic waste contamination.5 Under any theory, the waste generator is safely
insulated from liability to toxic waste victims by virtue of typical
"off-site" disposal practices. 6 A plaintiff may have to prove the vicarious liability of the generator for harmful acts connected with
the transportation of the waste or for activities associated with
the disposal operation. 7 The plausibility of strict products liability8 as an approach to compensation which transcends this hurdle
will be evaluated.
The second problem of proof is posed by a potential inability of
5. Negligence actions and certain unintentional nuisance actions require a
plaintiff to establish that the generator's failure to exercise reasonable care caused
the alleged injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1976). Because of the
necessity of establishing foreseeability in a negligence action, generators cannot
be held liable when their knowledge at the time of the alleged act or omission is
such that greater care is not warranted. See Pfenningstorf, Environmen4 Damages, and Compensation, 1979 Am. B. FouND. RESEARCH J. 347, 372. See generally
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 41, at 236-37 (4th ed. 1971).
Actions under theories of nuisance or strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities may avoid the need to prove failure of reasonable care. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977) (sets forth six criteria a court must weigh in
identifying an abnormally dangerous activity). See generally Rodburg, Generator
Liability for Off-Site Disposal, in HAZARDOUS WASTE LITGATION 100-32 (1981).
Since these theories guide courts to balance the social utility of the implicated activities against their detrimental consequences, considerable discretion is exercised by the court. Moreover, these actions appropriately apply to transportation
and disposal of wastes, not to waste generation. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
6. "Off-site" disposal refers to the practice of removing waste from the source
of its generation to another (potentially distant) location. Waste generators often
contract independent haulers to remove the waste from their facilities. Thus, control of the disposal operation, and consequential duties to the public at large, become responsibilities of third parties rather than generators. Accordingly, the
generators are not subject to the common law duties that possessors of land must
respect.
7. At common law, an employer ordinarily is not liable for torts committed by
an independent contractor performing contractual duties. W. PROSSER, supra note
5, § 71. See generally Comment, A PrivateNuisanceApproach to HazardousWaste
Disposal Sites, 7 Omo N.U.L. REV. 86, 94-95 (1980). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979). Liability can be imputed to the generator where it is
foreseeable that the independent contractor will commit a nuisance or trespass.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427B (1965). However, it appears that there is
no duty to inspect a disposal site operation. Ewell v. Petro Processors, Inc., 364 So.
2d 604 (La. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 575 (La. 1979). Consequently,
vicarious liability is likely to fail.
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), infra note 17. See
generally Note, Strict Liability For Generators, Transporters,and Disposers of
Hazardous Waste, 64 lMnmN. L. REV. 949, 977-85 (1980) (advocating a strict products
liability cause of action).
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plaintiffs to identify the defendant(s). This difficulty derives from
the nature of toxic waste disposal. Toxic wastes are often disposed at municipal dumps, or at other sites that serve as receptacles for numerous types of waste from any number of generators.
Even where records exist showing which generators are responsible for which toxic waste, it will be an onerous task to identify the
party(s) responsible for victims' injuries. A plaintiff must, with
scientific evidence, isolate the harmful substance, trace its path
and show its origin. 9
This Comment evaluates the parameters of the identification
quandary in light of tort theories that ease plaintiffs burden of
proof, and will encourage courts to adopt a more progressive analytical framework in the toxic waste context. The framework proposed herein assigns liability based on the risk of harm created
by a generator, in the absence of evidence of actual cause-in-fact
in a particular instance of injury. This mode of approaching the
identification problem is somewhat analogous to the market share
theory enunciated by the Supreme Court of California in the re1 0 Rather than alcent decision of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.
locating liability based on the relative market share of producers
of a hazardous drug, as in Sindell, this Comment argues for an allocation of liability based on the relative risk share of generators
in a toxic waste disposal "market" comprised of an aggregate
threat of harm to a plaintiff, created by a dumpsite.
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILTY

The internalization of all costs of production into the market, allowing prices to represent the true net social value of goods,
should be the fundamental goal of a strict liability system." The
policies underlying strict products liability would appropriately
apply to toxic waste generation. Justice Traynor's concurring
9. Soble, A Proposalfor the Administrative Compensationof Victims of Toxic
Substance, Pollution: A Model Act, 14 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 683, 706 (1977).
10. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); see also Hardy v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (applying the market share liability
theory articulated in Sindell to a variety of asbestos-related claims).
11. "[S]ocial and economic resources can be most efficiently allocated when
the actual costs of goods and services (including the loss they entail) are reflected

in their price to consumers." Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp.
1203, 1209 (E.D. Cal. 1976).

opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Botting Co.12 is the classic pronouncement of the important policies: 1) compensating innocent
victims; 2) fixing responsibility wherever it will most effectively
reduce the hazards of exposure to defective products; 3) shifting
the cost to the manufacturer who can insure against the risks of
injury and distribute them among the public as a cost of doing
business; and 4) placing responsibility on the party who introduced the risk into the market place.' 3
A special justification of the strict products liability approach
inheres in the nature of the toxic waste disposal site.' 4 Since numerous different substances may be deposited at a given site, the
harmful effects of toxic waste may result from the combinations
of and reactions between substances for which independent generators are responsible. 5 A plaintiff may need to prove fault
against each contributing generator on an individual basis because they are engaged in diverse activities entailing variable duties of care.
Moreover, a standard based on fault would provide insurmountable complexities if substances operate synergistically to induce
injury.16 Waste which is innocuous by itself may become deadly
when combined with other wastes at a disposal site. Liability for
negligence in this scenario would require that the dangers of the
reaction products be reasonably foreseeable by generators, in addition to the need to show vicarious liability for failure to contain
the waste.
Strict products liability is defined in Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Section 402A.17 California courts have already laid the
foundations for creative applications of section 402A by constru12. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-68, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (1944).
13. See Note, supra note 8, at 983-84. Recently the strict liability policies have
been cited in the toxic waste context. See United States v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 589 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1978).
14. The California Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that "one of the
principal purposes behind the strict products liability doctrine is to relieve an injured plaintiff of many of the onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence cause of action." Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 425, 573 P.2d 443,
455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978).
15. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
16. Comment, Love Canal:Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11
ENvr'L L. 133, 141 (1981).
In the Love Canal, the unseen nature of the underground chemical reac[T]he interactions of unneutralized and
tions enhances the danger ....
unsegregated chemical wastes indiscriminately mixed together (or even
stored contiguously in drums which will inevitably rupture and leak) in a
common disposal site.., make up a congeries of slow chemical reactions

having generally unspecified but potentially disastrous consequences over
long periods of time.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) sets forth the following criteria for strict products liability:
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ing its provisions broadly in order to more fully effectuate the Escola policies. First, courts have' recognized that the
"unreasonably dangerous" language may unreasonably preclude
recovery by plaintiffs. 18 Second, the original "consumer expectations" test for defective product design19 has been substantially
expanded. 20 Third, the "users and consumers" provision has
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
18. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972). The court declined to apply an "unreasonably dangerous" test because it "burdened the injured plaintiff with proof of an element that
rings of negligence."
19. A design defect is an inherent hazardous flaw associated with a whole
product line, as opposed to an individual unit (or a mistake in manufacturing).
Defective design liability should be attributed to generators of hazardous waste
because the manufacturing design, including the procedures that lead to dispensing the waste, creates the hazard. Concerning the proximate causation requirement, it is sufficient if the plaintiff proves that the defect "was a substantial factor
contributing to his injuries" and that there was "a direct, rather than a remote,
connection" between the defect and the injury. Id. at 127, 501 P.2d at 1157, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 437.
20. A defective product is one which "at the time it leaves the seller's hands
[is] in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, [and] which will
be unreasonably dangerous to him." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A
comment g (1965).
The California Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test for design defects:
First, a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary conSecond, a product may alternatively be found
sumer would expect ....
defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design
proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to establish that, on
balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in such design.
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
237-38 (1978). Under the second prong of the Barker test, the benefit of the design
would be measured by the cost of reducing the waste output or insuring that safe
disposal of toxic waste is practiced.
Nevertheless, the appropriate test to be applied in the toxic waste context
should be the same as that which is applied to bystanders injured by defective
products. A victim of toxic waste exposure should be presumed to have a reason-

been extended to cover bystanders.2 1 Pragmatic interpretations
of the Restatement should extend its application to toxic waste.
A basic difficulty in applying strict products liability to a generator of toxic waste is that the generator is not "one who sells a
product in a defective condition,"22 as defined by the Restatement
Section 402A.23 Toxic waste is merely a by-product of the primary

products manufactured and sold. Nevertheless, courts should recognize that the waste residual of the final product is a defect of
the product even though it is separated prior to sale; but for the
sale of the product, the hazard would not exist. Manufacturers of
toxic chemicals ought to be liable under product liability theory
in cases where the intended use entails a foreseeable dispersion
of a toxic waste into the environment. A hazard that becomes disjoined from the basic product should not be treated differently
simply because the product has not been purchased at the time of
the separation.
An additional problem in applying the Restatement to toxic
waste is that those injured are not "users or consumers" of a
product in accordance with the language of section 402A.24 Toxic

waste victims are bystanders of the by-product wastes of a production process. Many jurisdictions have permitted recovery by
mere bystanders in products liability cases. 25 Bystanders are per-

sons whose only connection with a defective product is that they
are victims of the defect. 26 This extension of the Restatement

should apply with equal force to victims of toxic waste exposure.
The policies justifying strict products liability are most appropriate for the protection of bystanders. Bystanders are in special
need of protection because they have no opportunity to inspect
the product that injures them.2 7 Whereas users of products avail
able expectation of freedom from hazardous wastes released into the environment. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
22. Hazardous waste generation should be considered a design defect since it
arises as an inherent characteristic of the manufacturing process.
23. See supra note 17.
24. Id.
25. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 662-64.
26. Id. at 663. In Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377
P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963), the California Supreme Court stated- "A
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." (emphasis added). In the subsequent
landmark case of Elnore v. American Motors Co., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84,
88-89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656-57 (1969), the California Supreme Court reiterated its
previous ruling and expanded the doctrine: "[I]n both Greenman and Vandermark we did not limit the rules stated to consumers and users but instead used
the language applicable to human beings generally."
27. "[I]f any distinction should be made between bystanders and users, it
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themselves of the benefits of a commodity, bystanders do not.
While some bystanders injured by defective products can at least
enjoy the protection afforded by a consumer's inspection of the
product during purchase and use, there is no such screen for
safety with toxic waste. Although some degree of uncertainty
may exist in strict products litigation whether injury is caused by
the defect in the product or by misuse by the consumer, it is certain that toxic waste injuries are caused by hazards of the
28
waste.
A defense may be advanced that a generator who does not wish
to engage in the disposal of toxic waste should be free to shift the
risk of liability to one who does. The products liability field long
ago experienced a cumulative expansion of liability from the producer through the chain of distribution.29 The "chain of distribution" for toxic waste disposal involves payments by a generator to
a contractor, rather than a series of sales, as with a product. Nevertheless, it is as unreasonable to allow generators to purchase
freedom from liability, as it would be to limit recovery in products
liability to privity.
Permitting a generator to escape liability by passing on the disposal responsibility would compromise each policy supporting his
liability.30 The waste generator typically has greater assets than
the hauler of the waste or the disposal site operator, and is in a
better position to distribute the cost of compensation. Generally,
a hauler of waste has no knowledge whatever of the potential
human health hazards. The knowledge necessary to safely dispose of toxic wastes is highly specialized and more easily ascertained and developed by the generator.
A cause of action in strict liability for injuries caused by hazardous waste should compensate plaintiffs who prove injury is
caused by toxic waste generated by the defendants. This action
should be made.., to extend greater liability in favor of the bystanders." Elmore
v. American Motors Co., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657.
28. Whether an action sounds in negligence or strict products liability, in order for liability to attach, plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defective design of defendant's product actually caused the harm at issue.
W. PRossER, supra note 5, §§ 41, 103.
29. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (no privity requirement when product negligently made); Henningsen v. Bloonifield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960) (liability of manufacturer for breach of
implied warranty of safety running to persons lacking privity).
30. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.

should encompass all toxic wastes, irrespective of the lack of
awareness regarding their hazards at the time of disposal.3 1
IDENTFYING DEFENDANTS

An injured party who attempts to identify responsible defendants confronts substantial problems where a general disposal site
is involved.3 2 Where many potential defendants exist, a plaintiff's
action may fail for inability to prove his case against any individual defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. The cause-infact problem is compounded by the presence of many types of
toxic waste in a given locale. These possibilities are often present
in tandem in off-site (waste hauled from source) disposal of toxic
waste.
The general disposal site becomes the focal point of a zone of
danger when toxic wastes are not adequately contained. Toxic
fumes or chemical leachates may migrate from the disposal site
onto the properties and into the bodies of innocent victims.33
Probably only a fraction of the substances found to have escaped
will be responsible for the injuries sustained. Possibly only one
substance, originating from one or more generators, is the actual
cause of injury. 34 These problems may be aggravated by the
length of time between disposal and the manifestation of the
35
harmful effect.
Evolving tort theories have mitigated the burdens of proving
cause-in-fact in multiple defendant cases. Their broadest application is warranted for toxic waste situations because of both the
severe dangers posed and the complexities due to the nature of
the disposal site.
Joint and Several Liability
Imposition of joint and several liability among several contributing pollutors is possible where an indivisible injury is in31. See RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 17, subsec. (2) (a) (knowledge of
product danger should not influence a determination of liability under the strict

products rationale).
32. Harley, Proof of Causation in Environmental Litigation, in Toxic TORTS
pt. H, 405 (P. Rheingold & N. Landau eds. 1977).
33. See generally M. TODD, GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY 44-47 (1959); M. BROWN,
supra note 1, at 194-97.
34. Harley, supra note 32, at 405-06.
35. Recovery may be hindered by uncertainties resulting from long incubation
periods for diseases and by statutes of limitations that do not have a "discovery
rule." See Comment, supra note 16, at 146-53.
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volved. 36 In Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 37 the
court statedh
Where the tortious acts of two or more wrongdoers join to produce an indivisible injury, that is, an injury which from its nature cannot be apportioned with reasonable certainty to the individual Wrongdoers, all of the
wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally liable for the entire damages
to judgment against any one sepaand the injured party may proceed
38
rately or against all in one suit.
39
The Restatement affims this analysis of liability for pollution.
Where a particular defendant shows that a "reasonable basis" for
pro rata apportionment of liability exists, a plaintiff may only recover for the proportionate amount of harm attributable to that
defendant.40

These theories may support the imposition of joint and several
liability upon generators contributing to a toxic waste disposal
site. An argument may be made that once the generators have
contributed to the disposal site, no "reasonable basis" for division

of the harm caused by the site can be discerned. However, this
theory falters where a distinct injury is likely caused by a specific
toxic waste.41 Where a collective contribution cannot be shown,
there is no basis for labeling an injury "indivisible." A plausible

argument for "indivisibility" might be advanced where multiple
toxic wastes, possessing identical noxious qualities, may cumulatively cause injury.42
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 and comments (1979); Mitchie v.
Great Lakes Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974).
37. 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
38. Id. at 734.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A comment i, illustrations 14, 15
(1965).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A comment d, illustrations 3, 4
(1965).
41. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 316.
42. In Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), several manufacturers of asbestos insulation were
held jointly and severally liable for the total damages sustained by an insulation
worker who contracted asbestosis as a result of working with defendants' products
over a 33-year period. The court statedIn the instant case, it is impossible, as a practical matter, to determine
with absolute certainty which particular exposure to asbestos dust resulted in injury to Borel. It is undisputed, however, that Borel contracted
asbestosis from inhaling asbestos dust and that he was exposed to the
products of all the defendants.... It was also established that the effect
of exposure to asbestos dust is cumulative, that is, each exposure may result in an additional and separate injury. We think, therefore, that on the
basis of strong circumstantial evidence the jury could find that each defendant was the cause in fact of some injury to BoreL
899
Id. at 1094.

Shifting the Burden of Proof
Courts have aided plaintiffs by shifting the burden of proving
factual causation if plaintiffs lack access to vital information. This
practice has been justified under basic principles of fairness to an
innocent victim: wrongdoers should not escape liability unless
they can establish that their wrongful act did not in fact cause the
harm.43 Some courts, by liberally applying the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, have even been willing to hold all defendants liable in
fact situations where it was certain that less than all were responsible.44 In such cases, the public interest in compensation
prevails over the potential unfairness to the particular non-causein-fact defendant.
A traditional prerequisite to shifting the burden of proof has
been that a plaintiff name all parties who were or could have been
responsible for the harm to the plaintiff.45 This could pose special
problems for the toxic waste victim, since numerous substances
(toxic waste from a disposal site or other substances present in
the environment) can be potential sources of injury. The greater
the number of potential sources of harm, the more difficult it will
be for a plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of evidence which
substance(s) are or could have been the causal agents of a particular injury. The existence of potentially hundreds of harmful substances escaping from a disposal site, or lurking in the
environment at large, reduces the likelihood that the small
number of defendants amenable to suit are in fact responsible.
Courts are hesitant to find liability when the group of defendants
being sued may not even include the party solely responsible for
the damages.
Market Share Liability
4 6 the California Supreme
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
the
"market
share"
theory of liability. The
Court enunciated
court created a modification of traditional cause-in-fact require43. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
44. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Litzman v. Humboldt Co., 273 P.2d 82 (1954) (hearing granted Aug. 6, 1954; dismissed Nov. 16, 1954).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 433B (1965). The burden of proof shifts to

the defendants only if the plaintiff can demonstrate that all defendants acted tortiously and that the harm resulted from one of them (comment g). It further
states that this rule has heretofore only been applied where all actors involved are
joined as defendants and where the conduct of all is simultaneous in time, but
cases might arise in which some modification of the rule would be necessary if one
of the actors is or cannot be joined, or because of the effects of a lapse of time, or
other circumstances (comment h).
46. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
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ments by shifting the burden of proof where fewer than all potential defendants are sued. Application of this approach to a toxic
waste disposal site scenario is warranted both by similarity between the cases and by underlying policy goals.
The market share approach assumes that when the specific
manufacturers of a deleterious fungible drug cannot be identified
through no fault of the plaintiff, the probability that the injury is
caused by a particular manufacturer is directly proportional to
the percentage of his market sales of the drug.47 The court stated
that:
If plaintiff joins in the action the manufacturers of a substantial share of
the DES which her mother might have taken, the injustice of shifting the
burden of proof to defendants to demonstrate that they could not have
made the substance which injured plaintiff is significantly diminished...
[W]e hold only that a substantial percentage [of the market] is required
[to shift the burden] .48

Following this approach, "[e]ach defendant will be held liable for
the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that
market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the
product which caused plaintiff's injuries."49 The result of employing a market share apportionment is that each defendant's liability will approximate its responsibility for injuries caused by the
50
DES it marketed.
The court relied on important policy considerations to support
the imposition of liability against the manufacturers of an inordinately harmful substance.5 1 The court began its discussion with
the broad proposition that:
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science
and technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and
which cannot be traced to any particular producer. The response of the
courts can either be to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery
to those injured5 2by such products, or to fashion remedies to meet these
changing needs.

The principal policy relied on by the Sindell court was advanced
formerly in Summers v. Tice:53 as between an innocent plaintiff
and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the in47. Id. at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
Id.
See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text for a comparison of the poli-

cies supporting market share and strict products liability.

52. 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (emphasis added).
53. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.

jury.54 Another policy cited is that defendants are in a better position to bear the cost of injury resulting from a defective product
because the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer
and distributed to the public as a cost of doing business. 5 5 Additionally, the court notes the benefit of providing an incentive toward greater product safety. 56
Risk Share Liability: An Adaptation of the Market Share Theory
to Toxic Waste
As in the case of a hazardous drug, an injury from exposure to
toxic waste may be inflicted by numerous possible sources. The
toxic waste "market" is comprised of all of the hazardous substances emanating from a dump site, as opposed to a market in
the economic sense. The relevant share that each defendant contributes to the site is actually a share of the toxic waste (or byproduct), rather than a portion of a market. 7 The overall market
in the toxic waste scenario would therefore be comprised of the
aggregate risk of harm posed to persons by all sources at a particular dumpsite.58
Whereas the share of liability for DES injuries is based on proportionate contribution to the market, liability for toxic waste
should be apportioned according to a defendant's contribution to
the aggregate risk of harm. Although the wastes disposed are
generally not fungible goods, their relative harm-producing capacities are, at least theoretically, susceptible of scientific quantification.59 The quantitative differences between the risks of various
substances can be measured in terms of characteristics such as
their respective concentrations, toxicity (risk of harm to humans),
60
and degradability in nature.
54.
55.
56.
57.

26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 963, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
Id.; see also supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.

58. This basis of apportionment resembles causal allocation of liability. Seegenerally M. Rizzo & F. Arnold, CausalApportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUm. L. REV. 1399 (1981) (argues for determining the relative
importance of causes by referring to their general harm-producing capacities).
59. Id.
60. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3001(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a)
(1976 & Supp. HI 1979). The statute provides that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) must promulgate criteria for identifying characteristics of hazardous waste and must establish a list of hazardous wastes. These criteria are required to take into account toxicity, persistence, degradability in nature, potential

for accumulation in tissue, and other hazardous characteristics.
A degree of hazard classification system has been suggested by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) as a means for providing a cost effective strategy for managing hazardous wastes. The OTA noted that a
quantitative degree of hazard classification system is feasible because particular
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When a substantial 6l "risk share" of potential causes for a particular injury is alleged by plaintiffs, the burden should shift to
the defendants to extricate themselves from liability. The defendant may then prove that the substances responsible for the injury
could not have originated from it, or that the waste could not have
caused the alleged injury.
The risk share approach can also facilitate resolution of
problems that arise when the harmful substance is identified but
the sources are not. If a plaintiff can identify a substantial share
of generators of a toxic waste which could have been disposed of
at the site in question, a shift in the burden of proof should be
warranted. 62 This would require that a relevant geographic region
be delineated from which the waste would likely have originated.
Economic constraints on the transfer of wastes from their source
to their disposal site would restrict the size of the relevant region.
Liability would then be apportioned based upon the relative share
of the waste being produced by a defendant-generator within that
region.
Policy Justificationfor Risk Share Liability
Although some defendants who are found liable under risk
share liability will not have actually contributed to a particular injury for which damages are sought, each generator found to be responsible for some share of the toxic waste which could have
caused injury will undoubtedly be responsible for a comparable
share of injuries caused by its own toxic waste. The court in
Sindell implicitly assumes that each defendant causes harm correlating to its market share of sales.63 Similarly, it is reasonable

to assume that the presence of a predictably hazardous waste in
wastes share important characteristics and because scientific data and criteria
that describe hazards are available or obtainable. 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 936 (1981).
Such a system would provide scientifically derived statutory criteria by which
courts could allocate liability.
61. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. This framework assumes that
the wastes are hazardous at the time they leave the generator. If hazardous reaction-products result from commingling at the disposal site, generators responsible
for the reacting wastes should be jointly and severally liable for the risk they catalyzed. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
62. Evidence of waste generation should be considered prima facie evidence
of improper disposal because, according to EPA estimates, up to 90% of all toxic
wastes are disposed of improperly. 9 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1301 (1978).
63. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

the environment inevitably causes harm to people.64
A shift in the burden of proof under these circumstances is justified under precisely the same grounds as the court cited in
Sindell,65 and derived from Summers:66 the plaintiff is not at fault
in failing to provide evidence of causation. The fact that the effects of toxic waste will generally be delayed,67 coupled with the
scientific uncertainty involved in dissecting the mechanisms of
disease,68 creates prohibitive barriers to the availability of proof to
plaintiffs. In allocating liability between generators of an implicated toxic waste, a waste generator should either know, or be
able to ascertain, the disposal site of its waste.6 9 In addition,
many defendants in a toxic waste suit have specialized scientific
knowledge, particularly those engaged in the manufacture of
chemicals. Accordingly, it would be fair to expect them to have
superior access to information regarding the dispersion of toxic
substances and their likely effects.
Where the precise harm-producing capabilities of certain toxic
wastes are unknown, or the individual causal agent cannot be isolated, the burden of proof should shift to defendants who collectively create the risks of harm to a plaintiff via the hazardous
waste. The court in Sindell placed a special emphasis on situations where medication is involved because the consumer is "virtually helpless to protect himself" from severe injuries caused by
deleterious drugs.70 Since toxic waste victims are not even aware
that they are assimilating doses of harmful substances, 7 1 they
have a considerable need for the protection of these policies.
The availability of a combination of strict liability with a risk
share allocation of responsibility serves similar policy goals. 72 It
is important to note that the Sindell court left open the theory of
liability to be applied to the defendants found to share liability.73
64. This is particularly true in a residential area where toxic substances persist in the groundwater.
65. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.

66. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).

67. See Council on Environmental Quality, Carcinogens in the Environment,

in Toxic TORTS pt. 11, 69, 87-89 (P. Rheingold &N. Landau eds. 1977).
68. Id.

69. This makes his task of extricating himself from liability less onerous than
a drug manufacturer of a fungible product.
70. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611, 607 P.2d 924, 963, 163 Cal.

Rptr. 132, 144.
71. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 12-13, 52-56 and accompanying text.
73. A shift in the burden of proof of causation should be no less available to
plaintiffs when an action sounds in strict products liability than when an action
sounds in negligence. In fact, greater justification may support a shift against multiple manufacturers of defective products; all producers of harmful products will
likely be the causes-in-fact of some injuries, whereas some negligent defendants
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The necessity of proving negligence against all generators of different wastes would markedly hinder the application of risk share
liability..
CONCLUSION

Improper disposal of hazardous wastes will inevitably impose
costs on third parties. Unless these real costs to society are internalized as an expense attendent to the production of goods, society will fail to optimally allocate its resources and injuries will go
uncompensated. Policy justifies a strict liability standard against
generators of toxic waste.
The same policy factors support a shift in the burden of proof
when a plaintiff cannot meet this burden through no fault of his
own. Risk share, a structural adaptation of the market share approach, could serve to effectuate a fair result where scientific uncertainty otherwise besets proof of factual cause. If injured
parties are to receive due compensation from those responsible,
courts will have to further flex their powers by "fashioning remedies to meet these changing needs." 74
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in the Summers v. Tice scenario may be causes-in-fact of no injuries. See supra
note 54 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the broad policies sought to be implemented by the Sindell court by allowing a plaintiff to state a cause of action are

derived from the strict products liability rationale. See sumpra notes 12-13 and 53-56
and accompanying text.
74. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 162 Cal.
Rptr. at 144.

